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COMMERCIAL TORTS AND DECEPTIVE
TRADE PRACTICES
by
Lyman G. Hughes* and Tim Gavin**
I. COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
A. Antitrust
ASES under the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 19831
have not yet reached the appellate courts, and the scope of this Arti-
cle does not include the review of federal law developments. One
Fifth Circuit decision during the survey period, however, did consider what
the court denominated a state antitrust claim arising under article 21.21,
section 4(4), of the Texas Insurance Code.2 In Hood v. Tenneco Texas Life
Insurance Co.3 the plaintiff alleged that his termination as an insurance
agent was the result of a boycott between his former employer and another
company, both wholly owned subsidiaries of Tenneco. 4 Plaintiff alleged vio-
lations of section 1 of the Sherman Act5 as well as of the Texas Insurance
Code.
In considering the state law claim, 6 the court stated that Texas courts
"probably" would apply the Insurance Code prohibition against boycotts by
parties who are independent and able to act in competition with one an-
other. 7 Because the court was uncertain whether Texas courts would apply
the holding in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. ,8 the court ana-
* B.A., Kansas State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at
Law, Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., St. Edwards University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law,
Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, Dallas, Texas.
1. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-.40 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
2. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 4(4) (Vernon 1981). The statute section prohibits
agreements, boycotts, intimidation, or coercion that result in or tend to result in unreasonable
restraint of, or monopoly in, the business of insurance.
3. 739 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1984).
4. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the Tenneco companies sought to stop the plain-
tiff from brokering for other companies.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (prohibiting contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint
of trade).
6. The federal antitrust claim was easily disposed of under Copperweld Corp. v. Inde-
pendence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2742-43, 81 L. Ed. 2d 628, 633-35 (1984), which held
that a parent corporation cannot conspire with its wholly owned subsidiary.
7. 739 F.2d at 1016 (quoting Padgitt v. Lone Star Gas Co., 213 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1948, no writ) (decided under TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 7426-28
(1960) (repealed 1967), the former Texas antitrust law)).
8. 104 S. Ct. 2731, 81 L. Ed. 628 (1984); see supra note 6.
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lyzed the plaintiffs state law claims under the precedents that would be ap-
plied under section 1 of the Sherman Act.9 The court affirmed the dismissal
of the plaintiff's claims, holding that the claims did not set forth a per se
violation and that under the facts the plaintiff had not shown an unreasona-
ble restraint on competition.' 0
B. Trade Secrets
Two cases decided during the survey period illustrate the application of
well established principles of Texas law governing disclosure of trade
secrets. I In Dailey International Sales Corp. v. Eastman Whipstock, Inc. 12
the Houston court of appeals held that a party who acquires knowledge of
an invention during the course of a confidential relationship, but subsequent
to the issuance of patents covering the invention, is not liable for the disclo-
sure of the invention to third parties. 13 The Fifth Circuit in Interox America
v. PPG Industries, Inc. 14 held, in affirming the denial of a preliminary injunc-
tion, that information relating to the configuration of a gas plant did not
constitute a trade secret. 15 Although the complex facts necessitated a nar-
row holding of the case, the court stated that when one voluntarily discloses
information or fails to take reasonable precautions to ensure its secrecy, he
cannot properly claim that the information constitutes a trade secret. 16 The
application of this holding to cases such as Dailey International Sales would
appear to be proper.
C. Trade Names
In a case of apparent first impression, the Dallas court of appeals held in
9. The court cited Transource Int'l v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1984);
Hornsby Oil Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 714 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 1983); Blackburn v.
Crum & Forster, 611 F.2d 102 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 906 (1980).
10. 739 F.2d 1018-19.
11. The Fifth Circuit also decided a third trade secret case during the survey period. In
Union Carbide Corp. v. UGI Corp., 731 F.2d 1186 (5th Cir. 1984), the Fifth Circuit held that
under Pennsylvania law technical and marketing information and strategies are protectable
trade secrets. Id. at 1191-92.
12. 662 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
13. Id. at 62. The court contrasted the situation in which a fiduciary acquires his knowl-
edge before the issuance of a patent on the product. Id. The distinction is not one of substance
and exists only to distinguish Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 314 S.W.2d 763, cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958), and K & G Oil & Tool Serv. Co. v. K & G Fishing Tool Serv.,
158 Tex. 594, 314 S.W.2d 782, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958). Hyde and K & G held that a
party who acquired confidential or trade secret information in the course of a confidential
relationship may be liable for its disclosure or use even after the information is public knowl-
edge. Hyde, 158 Tex. at 575-76, 314 S.W.2d at 773-75; K & G, 158 Tex. at 606-07, 314 S.W.2d
at 790-91. Hyde and K & G should be overruled to the extent that they stand for such a
principle, and Texas courts should adopt the common sense principles that once a party enti-
tled to protection makes public confidential information, all persons may use the information
freely irrespective of whether they gained knowledge of the information before or after it was
made public. See Hughes, Torts-Commercial, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 37 Sw. L.J. 1, 12
(1983), for discussion of other cases applying Hyde and its progeny.
14. 736 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1984).
15. Id. at 201.
16. Id. at 202.
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First Gibralter Mortgage Corp. v. Gibralter Savings Association17 that a de-
claratory judgment action is an available vehicle to determine infringement
or noninfringement of a protected trade name.' 8 The court's holding is
somewhat surprising in light of its recent holding in KMS. Research Labo-
ratories v. Willingham.I9 In K.M.S. the court of appeals held that the liabil-
ity of a potential defendant in a products liability case cannot be tested under
the Declaratory Judgment Act. 20 The court in First Gibraltar, however,
looked to federal precedent as it had previously in KMS.21 to decide the
issue. On the basis of a federal district court decision in Alabama,22 the
Dallas court upheld the right of action. 23
As trade name cases often turn upon the peculiar facts presented in each
instance, each particular case may be of narrow applicability. Two cases
decided during the survey period are nevertheless worthy of attention. Bank
of Texas v. Commerce Southwest, Inc. 24 illustrates the difficulty of proving a
protectable interest in a name which is descriptive in nature. Unless the
plaintiff can show that a descriptive name, in this instance a geographic loca-
tion, has acquired the necessary secondary meaning,25 it will not be pro-
tected.26 Despite a wide variety of forms of proof offered,27 the plaintiff
could not show that the name "Bank of Texas" acquired a secondary mean-
ing entitling it to protection. 28
Hudgens v. Goen29 serves as an example of the lack of precision often
present in Texas trade name cases. In Hudgens the defendant, Goen, owned
a funeral home that bore his name for a number of years. With Goen's
consent, Hudgens acquired the business from the first purchaser, and Goen
allowed Hudgens to use the Goen name for approximately two years, after
which he decided that he did not want his name to be associated with the
business. The court first held that in an unfair competition case, the plaintiff
need only show that (1) the name has a secondary meaning and (2) the use of
17. 658 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ dism'd).
18. Id. at 711.
19. 629 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
20. Id. at 174; TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1 (Vernon 1965 & Supp. 1985).
21. 629 S.W.2d at 174. The court relied upon Cunningham Bros., Inc. v. Bail, 407 F.2d
1165 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 959 (1969).
22. Pizitz, Inc. v. Pizitz Mercantile Co., 467 F. Supp. 1089, 1097-98 (N.D. Ala. 1979).
23. First Gibraltar, 658 S.W.2d at 711.
24. 741 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1984).
25. A term or name acquires a secondary meaning when, over a period of time, it has
come to be identified, in the mind of the public, with a particular product or producer. Kel-
logg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938); Continental Motors Corp. v. Conti-
nental Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857, 861 (5th Cir. 1967).
26. 741 F.2d at 787; I. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15.1(a)
(1973); see, e.g., Miller v. Lone Star Tavern, Inc., 593 S.W.2d 341, 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1979, no writ); Harrelson v. Wright, 339 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960,
writ ref'd).
27. The plaintiff presented evidence of nine years of use in Dallas County, extensive ad-
vertising, actual instances of consumer confusion, a consumer opinion poll, and expert
testimony.
28. 741 F.2d at 787.
29. 673 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the similar name by the defendant would confuse the public.30 The court
rejected the holding in Miller v. Lone Star Tavern, Inc.31 that the plaintiff
must also show a probability of irreparable harm.32 The court also held,
however, that when no competition was present not only must the plaintiff
show irreparable harm, but he must also show that the use of the name was
fraudulent. 33 Because the jury had found no likelihood of irreparable harm
and the plaintiff had not requested a special issue on whether the use of the
name amounted to fraud, the court reversed the award of injunctive relief.34
D. Trade Dress
Closely akin to the trade name cases are those in which the defendant has
appropriated the image or trade dress of a business or product, as, for exam-
ple, the size, shape, color, texture, graphics, and sales techniques. Two cases
involving restaurant operation decided during the survey period are note-
worthy in the trade dress area. In Freddie Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Ridgeline,
Inc. 35 the plaintiff sought and received a preliminary injunction against the
operation of a restaurant almost identical in design and approach to the
plaintiff's. 36 Relying on federal precedent,3 7 the court held that the essential
element in a trade dress case is proof that the alleged infringement creates a
likelihood of consumer confusion as to the source of the goods.3 8 The court
required proof of a secondary meaning 39 to the plaintiff's trade dress.4° The
court specifically found that the plaintiff had proven the existence of a secon-
dary meaning to its trade dress and that the plaintiff had shown that irrepa-
rable harm could occur from the defendant's infringement. 41
In Line Enterprises, Inc. v. Hooks & Matteson Enterprise, Inc. 42 the plain-
tiff, operators of County Line and State Line barbecue restaurants, sought to
enjoin the defendant from operating a restaurant of similar design and for-
mat. The trial court had instructed the jury to determine whether the de-
fendant intended to deceive the public. The Amarillo court of appeals held
30. Id. at 423-24.
31. 593 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
32. Id. at 344. Miller and the cases cited therein are frequently cited decisions, and the
court in Hudgens was perhaps cavalier in casting them aside. See infra notes 45-47 and accom-
panying text. The discussion of unfair competition cases in Hudgens was, however, a dictum.
33. 673 S.W.2d at 424.
34. Id. The supreme court will, one hopes, clarify the elements required in trade name
cases, both where competition is present and where it is not. If the plaintiff must show fraudu-
lent conduct as held in Hudgens v. Goen, clarification of the conduct that will satisfy the re-
quirement is necessary.
35. 589 F. Supp. 72 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
36. The trade dress of both restaurants included at least ten virtually identical features
ranging from the exposed glassed-in butcher shop concept to the same color neon lights and
beer signs. Id. at 74-75.
37. The court cited Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, 684 F.2d 821, 831
(11 th Cir. 1982) (likelihood of confusion is essential element in trade dress case).
38. 589 F. Supp. at 76.
39. See supra note 25.
40. 589 F. Supp. at 77.
41. Id. at 78.
42. 659 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no writ).
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that a finding of intent was not necessary. 43 The court stated that a showing
that deception will naturally and probably result from the operation or that
the public is likely to be deceived or confused is sufficient." The plaintiff's
claim that it was entitled to a preliminary injunction against the defendant
on its cause of action for unfair competition is of particular interest in view
of the trade name cases discussed above. The appellate court, citing Miller v.
Lone Star Taverns, Inc.,45 held that to be entitled to injunctive relief the
plaintiff must show that he will suffer irreparable harm.46 The court in Line
Enterprises is thus at direct odds with the Fort Worth court in Hudgens v.
Goen 47 on the question of the requirement of such a showing in an unfair
competition case. 48
Although the element of functionality4 9 does not arise in trade name
cases, it is important in situations involving trade dress. In an opinion far
too exhaustive to report here in detail, the Fifth Circuit thoroughly reviewed
the concept of functionality in Sicilia Di R. Brebow & Co. v. Cox. 50 At issue
was the defendant's design of a plastic citrus juice container similar to that
used by the plaintiff. The Fifth Circuit held that when a design merely as-
sists in a product's or configuration's utility, it is not functional and may be
protected. 51 In order to be legally functional, and thus unprotectable, the
design must be one of a limited number of equally efficient options such that
trademark protection would unduly hinder free competition.5 2 The court's
opinion, which the court considered to be its first confrontation with the
meaning and application of functionality, merits close attention by any attor-
ney faced with a trade dress case.
II. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT
A review of the development of the tort of interference with contractual
relations in this state reveals two fairly distinct lines of cases. Earlier cases
tended to describe the tort very generally without clearly articulating the
elements of the offense. 53 Later cases more precisely defined the tort and set
out four elements that must be shown: (1) that a contract existed; (2) that
the act of interference was willfull and intentional; (3) that the act of inter-
ference was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages; and (4) that ac-
43. Id. at 117.
44. Id.
45. 593 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
46. Id. at 344.
47. 673 S.W.2d 420, 423-24 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
48. For a discussion of Hudgens, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
49. Functionality requires that if utilitarian or functional considerations dictate a prod-
uct's design, the design will not be given protection. Sicilia Di R. Brebow & Co. v. Cox, 732
F.2d 417, 424-25 (5th Cir. 1984).
50. 732 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1984).
51. Id. at 429.
52. Id. Although directly at issue was the question of trademark protection, the trade
dress concept is directly analogous.
53. See, e.g., Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80, 91 (Tex.




tual damages or loss occurred. 54 As a defense, the defendant may show that
the interference was privileged or justified. 5"
The decision of the Houston court of appeals in Bellefonte Underwriters
Insurance Co. v. Brown5 6 followed the precision of the later cases and repre-
sents a good analysis of the tort of interference with contractual relations.
The case highlights the substantial risk that arises from what has been de-
scribed as a routine practice in the insurance industry. In Bellefonte Brown
had contracted with Bellefonte and six other insurance carriers for fire cov-
erage on his business facility. A fire occurred, and Bellefonte denied cover-
age based upon the mistaken belief that Brown had misrepresented the
specifications of the sprinkler system in Brown's facility. Bellefonte's Texas
agent sent a a telex to at least two of the co-insurers urging them to concur
with Bellefonte's decision and to deny coverage, thus strengthening Belle-
fonte's bargaining position with Brown. As a result of the telex, at least one
other insurer delayed payment under its policy. Eventually all insurers ex-
cept Bellefonte paid their portion of Brown's claim. In his claims against
Bellefonte, Brown alleged that the telex constituted a tortious interference
with his contractual relations with the co-insurers. The jury found each of
the four elements of a tortious interference and found that Bellefonte's acts
were either maliciously committed or done with reckless disregard of
Brown's rights. The trial court awarded punitive damages of $1,000,000.
Bellefonte argued that the sending of the telex was privileged because it
was an exercise of its own rights and that it possessed an equal interest to
that of the plaintiff in the subject matter. Bellefonte additionally pointed out
that each witness with insurance expertise testified that such communica-
tions were routine in such instances. The appellate court rejected Belle-
fonte's claim of privilege, holding that a privilege is lost if the
communication is made with malice or lack of good faith. 57
The claim of privilege or justification was also at issue in the subsequent
decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Sakowitz, Inc. v. Steck,58 but the
reasoning and outcome differed dramatically from Bellefonte. Steck placed
her name on the first page of an employment contract that contained a non-
competition clause but did not sign on the signature page. Steck subse-
quently left Sakowitz and went to work for Oshman's Sporting Goods in
violation of the restrictive covenant. Sakowitz's attorney wrote a letter to
Oshman's stating that Steck's new employment violated the noncompetition
agreement. Steck was terminated and brought an action for libel and tor-
54. See, e.g., Phillips v. Vandygriff, 711 F.2d 1217, 1230 (5th Cir. 1983), petition for cert.
filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3846 (U.S. May 7, 1984) (No. 83-1813); Leonard Duckworth, Inc. v.
Michael L. Field & Co., 516 F.2d 952, 956 (5th Cir. 1975); Armendariz v. Mora, 553 S.W.2d
400, 404 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
55. An interference is privileged or justified if the act is an exercise of the defendant's own
rights and the defendant's interest in the subject matter is at least equal to that of the plaintiff.
Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80, 91 (Tex. 1976).
56. 663 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. App.-Houston 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
57. Id. at 573. In a word of warning, the court stated that while insurance companies
have the right to exchange information, they may not solicit a conspiracy to deny a claim. Id.
58. 669 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1984).
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tious interference with her employment contract with Oshman's. Sakowitz
claimed that its conduct was privileged. The trial court granted summary
judgment to Sakowitz. The court of appeals reversed, holding that, with
respect to the tortious interference claim, the summary judgment evidence
did not establish the defense of privilege as a matter of law.59
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals in Sakowitz and rein-
stated the summary judgment. 6° The court, in an opinion by former Chief
Justice Pope, held that to establish her claim Steck had to show that (1) the
defendant maliciously interfered with the contractual relationship and
(2) the defendant did so without legal justification or excuse. 6' The court
went on to hold that Sakowitz was privileged to assert its claim to the non-
competition agreement if it asserted a colorable legal right.62 Because the
court found that Steck presented no summary judgment evidence regarding
lack of justification, the court affirmed the summary judgment against her.63
As the three-judge dissent pointed out, the elements of the tort of interfer-
ence with contractual relations have become reasonably well-established 64
and are not those the majority addressed. 65 Moreover, justification and priv-
ilege are affirmative defenses that the defendant must establish. 66 As the
dissent noted, the party asserting a privilege does not deny an interference,
but seeks to avoid liability based upon a claim interest that is being impaired
by the plaintiff. Such a defense should be a matter of "confession and avoid-
ance" upon which the defendant bears the burden of proof under the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure.67 The decision of the court in Sakowitz, Inc. v.
Steck appears to be a confused and incorrect analysis and represents a step
59. 659 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, rev'd, 669 S.W.2d 105 (Tex.
1984). The court of appeals held that the letter from Sakowitz's attorney, as a first step toward
litigation, enjoyed the same privilege from libel as do pleadings filed in the litigation itself. The
court, however, rejected Sakowitz's argument that a communication privileged from libel at-
tack automatically is privileged with respect to other causes of action. 659 S.W.2d at 93. The
libel claim was not at issue in the supreme court.
60. 669 S.W.2d at 107.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 108.
64. See supra note 54.
65. The majority cited Terry v. Zachry, 272 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.) as authority for its two-element definition of the claim. Terry did not so
hold. Although the court did state that an important element of the assertion of such is that
the interference must be without right or justification, the court's opinion, taken as a whole,
comes much closer to supporting the established four-element definition of the tort. Id. at 159;
Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80, 91 (Tex. 1976).
66. See, e.g., Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brown, 663 S.W.2d 562, 573 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Armendariz v. Mora, 553 S.W.2d 400, 404
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Tippett v. Hart, 497 S.W.2d 606, 613 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 501 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. 1973); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1979).
67. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 94. If the question of the proper placement of the burden of proof
on the issue of privilege or justification were ever in doubt, the doubt stems from the same
loose language of cases such as Terry v. Zachry, 272 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Cir. App.-San
Antonio 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538
S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1976), upon which the majority relied in formulating its two-element defini-
tion of the tort. No Texas case has squarely held that the plaintiff must disprove justification.
1985]
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backward in the development of the tort of interference with contractual
relations.68 Until the Texas Supreme Court resolves the apparent conflict
between Sakowitz and Bellefonte, the cautious plaintiff's counsel will plead




During the survey period employers did not fare well in their attempts to
prohibit former employees from engaging in competition in violation of cov-
enants not to compete. Under Texas law, restrictive covenants are enforcea-
ble if they are reasonable, and the test used in determining reasonableness is
whether the covenant imposes upon the employee any greater restraint than
is reasonably necessary to protect the business and good will of the em-
ployer.69 In determining whether a restraint is reasonably necessary to pro-
tect the business and good will of the employer, courts have focused upon
the scope of the restraint in terms of geographic area and length of time that
the covenant is to run.70 Courts will either refuse to enforce overbroad cove-
nants or enforce them only for a time and within an area that is reasonable
under the circumstances. 7 1
In Diesel Injection Sales & Services v. Renfro72 the court took an exceed-
ingly narrow view of what constitutes a restraint reasonably necessary to
protect the business and good will of the employer. Diesel, which operated a
diesel engine sales and repair shop in Nueces County, required its mechanics
to sign employment agreements that contained covenants not to engage in
the diesel fuel injection business within the county for a period of two years
following the termination of their employment. The defendants terminated
their employment with the plaintiff and, although they had signed such
agreements, immediately went to work for a competitor within the same
county.
68. The court's refusal of the writ of error in Bellefonte only serves to make matters
worse. Hopefully, the court will undo the damage done at the earliest opportunity.
69. Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 312-13, 340 S.W.2d 950, 951-52
(1960).
70. See id. at 312-13, 340 S.W.2d at 951; Hi-Line Elec. Co. v. Cryer, 659 S.W.2d 118
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ). The court in Hi-Line held that an agree-
ment not to compete within the existing marketing area of the employer or areas contemplated
or begun as expansion during the employee's employment, whether known to the employee or
unknown, was equivalent to an agreement not to compete anywhere in the world for the desig-
nated period and was therefore unenforceable. Id. at 121. The court also held that the plaintiff
failed to show a probable injury that would support the issuance of a temporary injunction
because the customers that the former employee solicited testified that they had not purchased
and did not contemplate purchasing goods from him. Id.
71. Martin v. Linen Syss. for Hosps., Inc., 671 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1984, no writ), in which the court reduced the length of time during which the employee
was prohibited from competing from eighteen months to one year and reduced the restricted
territory from a 10-mile radius of any customer of the employer to a 10-mile radius of the
employer's principal business office. Id.
72. 656 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
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In affirming the trial court's denial of a permanent injunction and dam-
ages, the appellate court held that restrictive covenants are only necessary to
protect the business and good will of the employer in instances in which the
employee either has had direct contact with customers or has been in posses-
sion of trade secrets or other confidential information of the employer.73
Although the defendants had been trained at Diesel's expense in a very com-
petitive business, the court held that the employer could not enforce the cov-
enants in the absence of customer contact or access to confidential
information.74
The dissent in Diesel was highly critical of the majority's narrow definition
of a restraint reasonably necessary for the protection of the business and
good will of an employer. 75 The dissent noted that although cases in which
employees have had access to trade secrets or direct contact with customers
constitute the majority of cases in which covenants not to compete have been
enforced, those cases are not exclusive. 76 Emphasizing both the considerable
expense undertaken to educate and train the defendants as mechanics in a
highly specialized field and the high demand for trained diesel engine
mechanics in Nueces County, the dissent argued that the covenant not to
compete was necessary in order to protect the business and good will of
Diesel. 77
The employer in Mejerle v. Brookhollow Office Products, Inc. 78 sought to
enjoin its former employees from engaging in acts of allegedly unfair compe-
tition in the absence of a covenant not to compete. The plaintiff employer
sought to uphold the trial court's issuance of a temporary injunction on the
ground that the employees had breached their implied duty of loyalty. The
plaintiff alleged that during their employment, the defendants had profited
by supplying the plaintiffs customers with products furnished by competi-
tors. After their termination, the defendants had continued to call upon
these same customers. The trial court granted a temporary injunction
prohibiting the defendants from calling upon those customers that were cul-
tivated during the defendants' employment with the plaintiff. The court of
appeals reversed, holding that although these particular acts could give rise
to a cause of action for damages, they did not demonstrate any need for the
entry of injunctive relief.79
73. Id. at 570-71.
74. Id. at 572.
75. Id. at 574-75 (Nye, C.J., dissenting).
76. See Sakowitz, Inc. v. Steck, 669 S.W.2d 105, 106-07 (Tex. 1984), discussed supra notes
58-68. The sole justification asserted for the covenant not to compete was the employer's
understandable reluctance to undergo the expense of training personnel who could then imme-
diately go to work for competitors. The supreme court did not question the validity of this
justification.
77. 656 S.W.2d at 574-75. The dissent would appear to have the better side of the argu-
ment. Under some circumstances the protection of an employer's business and good will re-
quires preventing employees that have been trained at its expense from using that training in
direct competition. The majority's contrary conclusion can only be attributed to a desire to
restrict the circumstances under which employees can be subjected to restrictive covenants.
78. 666 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
79. Id. at 193-94. The court expressly disapproved of the earlier decision of Gaal v.
19851
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Executive Tele-Communication Systems, Inc. v. Buchbaum 80 turned on a
point of procedure of which practitioners should be aware. The plaintiff's
petition alleged that the defendant violated a written covenant not to com-
pete, and the defendant filed only a general denial in response. At the tem-
porary injunction hearing, the defendant testified that he did not execute the
employment contract. Although the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure8' re-
quire a party to file a sworn denial of execution of a written instrument,8 2 the
court held that the provisions of the rule do not apply to temporary injunc-
tion hearings. 83 Therefore, those who seek to enforce covenants by way of a
temporary injunction should be prepared to prove the existence of the agree-
ment regardless of the state of the pleadings.
Greenstein v. Simpson84 contained the only good news for employers seek-
ing to enforce covenants not to compete. The court addressed the novel
issue of whether the breach of an invalid covenant authorizes the withhold-
ing of payment by the maker of a note given as consideration for the invalid
covenant. The plaintiff sold his interest in an accounting partnership and
received promissory notes from the individual partners who acquired his
share. The plaintiff brought suit to enforce the notes, and the partners de-
fended on the ground that the plaintiff had violated a covenant not to com-
pete given in exchange for the notes. The court found that the
noncompetition agreement constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade
and hence was unenforceable; consequently, the defendants could not have
recovered monetary damages from the plaintiff for his breach of the agree-
ment, nor could they have obtained an injunction to enforce the covenant.8 5
The court nevertheless held that the partial failure of consideration that oc-
curred when the plaintiff reentered the accounting practice entitled the de-
fendants to reduce the unpaid balances due on the promissory notes. 86
B. Wrongful Termination
In Hauck v. Sabine Pilots, Inc. 87, recently affirmed by the Texas Supreme
Court, the first crack has been made in the previously impregnable employ-
ment-at-will doctrine, which provides that absent a definite term of service
BASF Wyandotte Corp., 533 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no
writ), in which the court upheld a temporary injunction on very similar facts. The court con-
cluded that the issuance of a temporary injunction in this instance would be purely punitive.
Id. at 155.
80. 669 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
81. TEX. R. Civ. P. 93(7).
82. If the denial is not properly sworn, the instrument is received as fully proved. Id.
83. 669 S.W.2d at 403.
84. 660 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. App.-Waco 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
85. Id. at 159-60.
86. Id. at 160. The court concluded that the defendants would not have purchased the
plaintiff's interest in the partnership without his agreement to retire permanently from the
practice, which meant that the agreement to retire and the promise to pay were dependent
covenants. Id. The court reasoned that to refuse to allow the defendants to assert failure of
consideration would allow the plaintiff to receive the full benefit of his agreement despite his
breach of the essential covenant. Id. at 161.




stated in the employment agreement an employer may terminate an em-
ployee at any time, with or without cause. 88 Numerous cases decided during
the survey period followed this principle. 89 Based on this well-established
line of authority the trial court in Hauck granted a summary judgment deny-
ing the plaintiff any recovery on his claim for wrongful termination of em-
ployment. The court of appeals reversed, holding that an employee states a
cause of action, even in the absence of a specific term regarding the length of
his employment, if he shows that his termination was the result of his failure
to commit an illegal act his employer ordered.90 Although Hauck hardly
represents a radical departure from the at-will doctrine, another court of
appeals had previously refused to restrict in any way the employer's absolute
right to terminate employees at will. 91
IV. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
A. Definition of Consumer
Texas courts continue to grapple with the question of who qualifies as a
consumer entitled to bring suit under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-
Consumer Protection Act (DTPA).92 In La Sara Grain Co. v. First National
Bank93 the Texas Supreme Court expounded upon the principles announced
in its earlier decision of Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co.94 regarding
the circumstances under which a bank customer is a consumer for purposes
of the DTPA. One of La Sara's employees had applied proceeds of company
loans from the bank for his personal use. La Sara claimed that the bank's
conduct in the transactions was actionable under the DTPA. The court
dealt with the unauthorized loans by reaffirming its holding in Riverside Na-
tional Bank v. Lewis,95 stating that a person who seeks only to borrow
money is not a consumer because the lending of money involves neither a
good nor a service. 96 The court noted, however, that under its decision in
Flenniken a lender may be subject to a DTPA claim if the borrower's objec-
tive is to purchase or lease a good or service.97 The court held that this
88. East Line & Red River R.R. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888).
89. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l Inc. v. Maurer, 675 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1984, no writ); Moulder v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 665 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
90. 672 S.W.2d at 323-24.
91. See Maus v. National Living Centers, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 674, 677 (Tex. App.-Austin
1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.), in which the court held that a plaintiff nurse failed to state a claim for
wrongful termination when she alleged that she had been fired for complaining about substan-
dard conditions in the nursing home in which she was employed. The court held that the
plaintiff stated no claim despite the fact that failure to report the substandard conditions vio-
lated TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4442c, § 16 (Vernon Supp. 1985), which makes failure
to report such conditions a criminal offense. Id.
92, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
93. 673 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1984).
94. 661 S.W.2d 705, 707-08 (Tex. 1983) (plaintiff who sought loan to buy house is con-
sumer); see Hughes, Torts-Commercial, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 35, 41
(1984).
95. 603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1980) (plaintiff who sought loan was not consumer).
96. Id. at 174-75.
97. 673 S.W.2d at 567.
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overriding objective would qualify a borrower as a consumer. 98
Juarez v. Bank of Austin99 illustates that if a bank extends any services in
connection with the extension of credit, the borrower will qualify as a con-
sumer under the DTPA. The defendant bank in Juarez had extended two
loans to the plaintiff and had provided other services, including the extension
of credit insurance and the processing of various medical reports pertaining
to the plaintiff's disability. In light of these services, the court held that the
plaintiff was a consumer under the DTPA. 100 Similarly, in Mercantile Mort-
gage Co. v. University Homes, Inc. 101 the court held that one who seeks or
acquires loan brokerage services qualifies as a consumer.' 0 2
The court in First National Bank v. Hackworth 103 faced a fact situation
very similar to that presented in La Sara. Hackworth died during the pen-
dency of the action, however, and the court held that her death extinguished
any cause of action under the DTPA.104 The court reasoned that since the
DTPA did not contain any provisions regarding the survivability of claims,
the court would be forced to apply the common law rule.10 5 Under such
principles, actions asserting a purely personal right terminate with the death
of the aggrieved party, and the right to recover punitive damages is consid-
ered to be purely personal. 10 6 From these established tenets, the court
leaped to the questionable conclusion that no actions under the DTPA sur-
vive the death of the aggrieved party.'0 7
In Big H Auto Auction, Inc. v. Saenz Motors108 the Texas Supreme Court
analyzed the legislative history of the DTPA and concluded that a buyer of
goods for resale is a consumer who has standing to bring suit under the
98. Id.
99. 659 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
100. Id. at 142; see McCrann v. Klaneckey, 667 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1984, no writ) (insurance is within the category of service under the DTPA).
101. 663 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
102. Id. at 47-48. As a result, Riverside National Bank will only bar a DTPA claim in that
rare instance in which a plaintiff brings suit directly against a bank or other lender that has
done nothing more than loan to the plaintiff money that is not intended for use to purchase
goods or services.
103. 673 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ). Hackworth maintained a
checking account with the defendant bank and brought suit to recover sums that she alleged
were wrongfully paid from her account on checks that had been forged or altered.
104. Id. at 220-21.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 220; Johnson v. Rolls, 97 Tex. 453, 457, 79 S.W. 513, 514 (1904); Scoggins v.
Southwestern Elec. Serv. Co., 434 S.W.2d 376, 379-80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
107. 673 S.W.2d at 221. Although the court's reasoning may have some merit with respect
to an award of treble damages, the court's decision would preclude the recovery of even actual
damages to the estate of a deceased party. This result can only be justified by holding that the
entire cause of action created under the DTPA is punitive in nature, a conclusion which would
be difficult to reach in light of the provisions of the Act itself. Specifically, TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon Supp. 1985) provides that the underlying purpose of the Act is to
protect consumers and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protec-
tion. As the dissent pointed out, in keeping with this directive one court characterized the
DTPA as remedial in nature and not punitive. See Ranger County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Guinn,
608 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ dism'd).
108. 665 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1984).
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DTPA.10 9 The court held, on the basis of questionable reasoning, that a
purchase for resale constitutes a purchase for use within the meaning of the
DTPA.1 0 If the purchase for resale is "for use," a purchase that would not
qualify under this standard is difficult to imagine.
The court's decision in Superior Trucks, Inc. v. Allen"' expanded dramat-
ically the class of persons who qualify as consumers under the DTPA. The
plaintiffs in that case were two brothers, Jumel and Richard, who proposed
to enter the trucking business. Jumel purchased a truck from the defendant
that Richard was to drive for the business. After seven weeks the truck
collapsed while Richard was driving, and both brothers joined as plaintiffs in
a DTPA suit. Although Jumel alone purchased the truck, the court held
that Richard qualified as a consumer as well." 2 The court reasoned that
since Richard was the one who was to drive the truck, and since he in-
spected, test drove, and accepted delivery of the truck, he had sought goods
within the meaning of the DTPA and thus had standing to sue under that
Act.''
3
In Wheeler v. Box 1 4 the Dallas court of appeals held that a purchaser of a
business can qualify as a consumer under the DTPA." 5 Although a busi-
ness entity itself is an intangible that would not fall within the definition of
goods under the DTPA, 116 the plaintiffs in Wheeler were franchisees of the
defendant and acquired both the business entity itself and tangible personal
property and services purchased for use in the operation of the business.
The court, therefore, held that the plaintiffs were consumers within the
meaning of the DTPA.7
B. Notice
Two cases decided during the survey period dealt with the sufficiency of
the written notice called for by section 17.50A of the DTPA." 18 In Hollings-
109. Id. at 759.
110. Id; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(1) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (definition of
goods).
111. 664 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
112. Id. at 147-48.
113. Id. The DTPA defines consumer as including all those who seek or acquire, by
purchase or lease, any goods or services. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45 (Vernon
Supp. 1985). Under the court's analysis, any employee who assists his employer in obtaining
equipment and who later operates that equipment can bring suit under the DTPA if he subse-
quently sustains injury due to a defect in the equipment. This unwarranted expansion of the
class of potential plaintiffs under the DTPA stems from the erroneous characterization of the
plaintiff in Allen as one who sought goods. This class of consumers should be limited to those
persons who seek actually to purchase or lease goods rather than including those who seek
merely to use goods that another will purchase.
114. 671 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
115. Id. at 77-78.
116. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(1) (Vernon Supp. 1985) defines goods as tan-
gible chattels or real property purchased or leased for use.
117. 671 S.W.2d at 77-78.
118. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.50A(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985) requires a plaintiff
to provide a potential DTPA defendant with notice of his complaint and the amount of dam-
ages and expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred at least 30 days before filing suit.
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worth Roofing Co. v. Morrison'19 the plaintiff's demand letter gave timely
notice of her intent to seek redress under the DTPA, but rather than specify
the amount of damages that she had sustained, the notice merely stated the
nature of her claim and that she was in the process of obtaining an estimate
of her damages. The court concluded that the written notice must specify
the amount of actual damages the complaining party has sustained, and the
absence of this information in the present case rendered the plaintiff's notice
defective. 120 As a result, the court held that the DTPA entitled the plaintiff
to recover actual but not punitive damages. 12 1
In North American Van Lines v. Bauerle122 the plaintiff brought suit
against the defendant moving company for damage the mover caused to a
piano. The plaintiff's DTPA notice stated that the plaintiff's claim resulted
from damages occasioned to property the defendant moved. In specifying
the violations of the DTPA that had occurred, the letter merely indicated
that false, misleading, and deceptive acts and violations of express and im-
plied warranties had occurred. On motion for rehearing the court held that




Consumers are authorized to bring suit for money damages under the
DTPA whenever a deceptive act or practice that is specifically enumerated
in subsection (b) of section 17.46 of the Act constitutes a producing cause of
actual damages. 124 The list of deceptive acts specifically enumerated within
that section includes representing that an agreement confers rights that it
does not actually confer or that are prohibited by law. 125 Plaintiffs have
attempted to use this provision to transform suits for simple breach of con-
tract into DTPA actions. The Texas Supreme Court has resisted this at-
tempted expansion of the DTPA by stating unequivocally that an allegation
of a mere breach of contract, without more, does not constitute a violation of
the DTPA. 126 This conclusion stems from the fact that the rights that arise
out of a contract are the right to demand performance or the right to bring
suit for damages in the event the other part refuses to comply with the con-
tract's terms. A party still possesses these rights when the other party to the
agreement fails to perform. Consequently, entering into the original agree-
ment does not constitute a representation that the agreement involves rights
that it does not have simply because the other party later fails to perform. 127
119. 668 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ).
120. Id. at 875.
121. Id.
122. No. 2-83-188-CV (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, Sept. 13, 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (not yet
reported).
123. Id., slip op. at 13-14.
124. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
125. Id. § 17.46(b)(12).
126. Ashford Dev., Inc. v. USLife Real Estate Serv. Corp., 661 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex.
1983).
127. See Juarez v. Bank of Austin, 659 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ
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Several cases decided during the survey period illustrate the circumstances
under which a complaining party can invoke the provisions of section
17.46(b)(12).1 28 In Tidelands Life Insurance Co. v. Harris129 the plaintiff
pursued a claim under the DTPA based upon the defendant insurance com-
pany's failure to pay health insurance benefits. During the course of com-
pleting an application for the policy the plaintiff had informed the insurance
company's agent that he had a heart problem. The agent advised him that
future heart problems would be covered under the health insurance policy.
The plaintiff subsequently suffered a heart attack, and the insurance com-
pany denied coverage on the basis of the policy's preexisting condition
clause. The court held that by representing that the policy would cover a
condition that it clearly did not, the defendant had represented that the con-
tract of insurance conferred rights that it did not actually grant, which was
actionable under the DTPA.1 30
In Citizen State Bank v. Bowles 131 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
bank represented that it had the authority to convey the property that was
the subject of a contract of sale. After the plaintiff entered into a contract to
purchase the property, third parties who held a right of first refusal exercised
the right, and the bank thus lacked the power to convey the property to the
plaintiff. The court held this failure to convey was actionable under the
DTPA. 132
The court in Watson v. Bettinger'"3 took a different approach in trans-
forming a simple breach of contract into a deceptive trade practice. The
defendant builder entered into a contract to sell a home to the plaintiff. The
contract provided that latent defects were to be repaired completely prior to
closing. The builder attempted to make the repairs, but was unable to do so.
The builder had made no representations of any kind to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff relied solely upon the language contained within the contract to
support his cause of action. Although the defendant's failure to perform
would be merely an actionable breach of contract, the court, through tor-
ref'd n.r.e.), discussed supra note 99 and accompanying text. For example, if a party at the
time of making an agreement to sell Blackacre represents to the other party that the contract
gives him the right to purchase Blackacre, a subsequent failure to convey the property does not
become actionable as a misrepresentation that the contract conferred rights that it did not
have. After the breach the purchaser still has the right to bring suit to enforce the agreement.
If, however, the seller were to enter into an agreement to sell Blackacre and were to represent
to the purchaser that the agreement included Whiteacre when it did not, this misrepresenta-
tion could be actionable as a representation that the contract involves rights that it does not
have.
128. TEX. BUs. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(12) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
129. 675 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
130. Id. at 226.
131. 663 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ dism'd).
132. Id. at 849. The court's decision is difficult to reconcile with the principles established
by previous decisions. The contract that was the subject of the suit covered the property that
the plaintiff sought to purchase, and upon the defendant's refusal to convey the plaintiff still
possessed the right to bring suit under the contract. The court should have invoked the princi-
ple that a mere breach of contract is not actionable as a deceptive trade practice, and limited
the plaintiff to his contractual remedy. See supra text accompanying note 126.
133. 658 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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tured reasoning, affirmed the jury's finding that the agreement to repair the
house by the time of closing constituted a misrepresentation regarding the
characteristics or qualities of the house.134
The DTPA also authorizes consumers to bring suit when they have been
damaged by a breach of an express or implied warranty. 135 In a case involv-
ing an express warranty of the suitability of a truck for a particular purpose,
the court in Superior Trucks, Inc. v. Allen 136 reformed and affirmed a judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff. 137 The court had more difficulty in finding an
express warranty in Appleby v. Hendrix.138 The defendant placed a maga-
zine advertisement offering to sell stallions. The advertisement stated that
these stallions created an opportunity for those who wished to acquire top
bloodlines for sensible prices. The court interpreted this statement to be an
expression that the bloodlines were to continue and thus constituted an ex-
press representation that the horses described in the advertisement were fer-
tile. 139 Consequently, the court allowed a purchaser of an infertile horse to
bring suit under the DTPA for breach of this express warranty.'40
Two other cases decided during the survey period dealt with actionable
breaches of implied warranties. In Horta v. Tennison141 and in Keller v.
Judd 1 42 two different courts of appeals held that a seller of an automobile
who does not have a good title breaches an implied warranty of title under
the UCC. 143 Purchasers in both cases thus were allowed to maintain actions
under the DTPA.144
In La Sara Grain Co. v. First National Bank1 45 the court considered
whether the defendant bank's act of paying checks in violation of a dual-
signature requirement violated any implied warranties. Although the court
confirmed that owners of checking accounts are consumers and as such have
standing to pursue a DTPA claim, the court found no authority for the
proposition that a bank's agreement not to pay checks on unauthorized sig-
134. Id. at 759. Such representations are actionable under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.46(b)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1985). The court held that the agreement to make the necessary
repairs constituted a representation that such repairs were capable of being performed within
the time specified. 658 S.W.2d at 759. Since the repairs could not be performed within the
time provided, the court held that the implied representation that the home could be repaired
was false. Id. Consequently, the court held that the defendant had misrepresented the charac-
teristics or qualities of the house, i.e., the "repairability" of the house. Id. The effect of the
court's ruling is that any time a party agrees to perform repairs to an object prior to conveying
that object, if it later turns out that the repairs were not capable of being performed, the act of
entering into the agreement will itself constitute a deceptive trade practice.
135. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
136. 664 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
137. Id. at 141-42.
138. 673 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984, no writ).
139. Id. at 298-99.
140. Id.
141. 671 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
142. 671 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
143. Horta, 671 S.W.2d at 723-24; Keller, 671 S.W.2d at 604; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 2.312 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (seller of goods warrants good title).
144. Horta, 671 S.W.2d at 723-24; Keller, 671 S.W.2d at 607-08.
145. 673 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1984); see supra notes 93-98.
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natures rises to the level of a warranty. 146 The court, therefore, limited the
plaintiff to a breach of contract claim and reversed the award of treble dam-
ages under the DTPA. 147
The DTPA also authorizes a consumer to bring suit if he has been victim-
ized by an unconscionable action or course of action.14 8 Unconscionable
action includes an act that results in a gross disparity between the value
received and the consideration paid by a consumer. 149 In Diversified Human
Resources Group, Inc. v. PB-KBB, Inc. '5 0 the court held that the plaintiff had
been victimized by an unconscionable course of action when the defendant
employment agency, with whom the plaintiff had contracted to provide a
graduate engineer, put the plaintiff in contact with an applicant who later
turned out to have no degree.' 5' The court ordered the agency to return the
consideration the plaintiff had paid even though the agency had no knowl-
edge that the applicant had lied about his educational background. 15 2
In Vick v. George153 the court held that purchasers of interests in an oil
and gas lease that turned out to be worthless could maintain a DTPA claim
for the defendant's unconscionable action. 154 Since the interests were worth-
less, the court held that a gross disparity existed between the consideration
given and the benefit the plaintiffs received.'"5 Finally, in Koonce v. Chas-
tain' 56 the court reversed a judgment awarding the plaintiffs damages that
the defendant's unconscionable action allegedly caused. 5 7 In Koonce the
plaintiffs purchased real property from the defendant seller, who had repre-
sented that the adjoining property would be used strictly for residential pur-
poses. The adjacent property was developed for commercial purposes,
however, and the plaintiffs' expert witness testified that this commercial use
diminished the value of the plaintiffs' property. Although the expert's testi-
mony established that the property purchased from the defendant had not
appreciated to the level that it would have if the use of adjoining property
had been limited as the defendant had represented, the court found no evi-
dence of a gross disparity between the consideration paid and the value of
the property at the time of purchase.' 58
D. Persons Who Are Liable
In Wheeler v. Box 59 the Dallas court of appeals cited well-established
146. 673 S.W.2d. at 565.
147. Id. at 567-68.
148. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
149. Id. § 17.45(5)(b).
150. 671 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.).
151. Id. at 636-37.
152. Id.
153. 671 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
154. Id. at 550.
155. Id.
156. 674 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. App.-E1. Paso 1984, writ granted).
157. Id. at 486.
158. Id.
159. 671 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
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precedent'60 in support of the proposition that an agent is personally liable
for his own torts. The court thus concluded that an agent or officer of a
corporation who makes misrepresentations to a consumer solely in the fur-
therance of the business of his employer is personally liable for the misrepre-
sentations. 161 In George D. Thomas Builder, Inc. v. Timmons162 the court
considered the extent to which a principal can be held responsible for mis-
representations a real estate agent has made. The purchaser of a home found
that the real estate agent had overstated the home's square footage and sued
both the agent and the builder-seller. The issue presented was the extent to
which the builder-seller, who made no representations, could be held liable
for the agent's misrepresentation. The court held that since the real estate
agent was a special agent with no implied authority to make representations
with respect to the quality of the property sold, the builder-seller could not
be held liable for additional penalities provided under the DTPA.163 The
court nevertheless held the builder-seller liable for actual damages, citing a
Texas Supreme Court case that predated the enactment of the DTPA.164
The court in Potere, Inc. v. National Realty Service165 expanded the list of
persons who can be held liable for a DTPA violation. In Potere the plaintiff
purchased a real estate franchise from Matchmaker. Under the franchise
agreement, the franchisee could submit homes for Matchmaker's purchase if
the property had not been sold durings its listing period. When Matchmaker
refused to purchase the house, the plaintiff brought suit under the DTPA
against both Matchmaker and Potere, a related entity. Potere appealed a
judgment entered against it, claiming that it could not be held responsible
for the conduct of Matchmaker.
The appellate court held that Potere could be held liable for the DTPA
violations of Matchmaker despite the fact that the two had no principal-
agency relationship. 66 The court reasoned that the DTPA allows a con-
sumer to bring suit against any person for false, misleading, or deceptive
acts.167 Furthermore, the Act defines "person" to mean "an individual,
160. See Light v. Wilson, 663 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1983) (Spears, J., concurring), and
cases cited therein.
161. Wheeler, 671 S.W.2d at 79.
162. 658 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
163. Id. at 197.
164. Id; see Loma Vista Dev. Co. v. Johnson, 142 Tex. 686, 691, 180 S.W.2d 922, 924
(1944) (seller liable for agent's unauthorized misrepresentation). No statutory basis exists for
applying the substantive provisions of the DTPA and yet refusing to award the relief provided
under the Act. The court attempted to justify its holding by referring to TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1985), which imposes liability upon a person who
even unknowingly benefits from a false representation made by another in order to induce a
person to purchase real estate or securities. Reliance upon § 27.01 would be understandable if
the plaintiff had pleaded or proved a cause of action based upon this statute, but the plaintiff
had limited his case to a DTPA claim and a negligence claim. The use of principles applicable
to an unpleaded cause of action to define the relief available under the DTPA is difficult to
understand. If the defendant's conduct is actionable under the DTPA, then the plaintiff
should be able to seek recovery of all of the relief provided by the Act; otherwise, the plaintiff
should be denied any recovery on his DTPA claim.
165. 667 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
166. Id. at 257-58.
167. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
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partnership, corporation, association, or other group, however organ-
ized."1 68 The court held that the phrase "other group, however organized"
indicated an intent to extend liability beyond traditional business organiza-
tions. 169 The court stated that "[w]hen two or more entities develop a [sic]
extensive relationship, even though the combination falls short of a tradi-
tional business organization, each entity may be held responsible for the acts
and representations of the other entity or entities."' 70 Since Potere and
Matchmaker had entered into several agreements pursuant to which they
were jointly involved in the Matchmaker Home Equity program, the court
held that Potere could be held liable for the DTPA violations of Match-
maker.' 7' The court concluded that their relationship was so close that
Potere and Matchmaker were inextricably intertwined, with the result that
they were both liable for the DTPA violations.' 72
The court's decision in Potere contrasts with the decision in Chambless v.
Barry Robinson Farm Supply, Inc. ' 73 In Chambless the plaintiff brought a
DTPA suit against both the dealer who sold him a tractor and the tractor's
manufacturer. The court affirmed a directed verdict in favor of the manu-
facturer on the ground that the plaintiff failed to establish any agency rela-
tionship between it and the dealer.' 74 The court held that, absent a showing
of agency, the manufacturer could not be found liable for any representa-
tions made by the dealer. 75 The court did not discuss the definition of "per-
son" found in the DTPA.
E. Defenses
Several cases decided during the survey period considered the statutory
defenses available under the DTPA. Section 17.50A of the Act provides a
means by which a defendant may limit his liability under the DTPA."76 In
Cail v. Service Motors, Inc 177 the Texas Supreme Court demanded strict
compliance with the procedures set forth in section 17.50A before a defend-
ant could invoke the protections of that section. In Cail the plaintiff
purchased a truck that was not as the defendant had represented. The plain-
tiff then sent a DTPA demand letter alleging $4,500 in actual damages and
168. Id. § 17.45(3).
169. 667 S.W.2d at 256-57.
170. Id. at 256.
171. Id. at 256-57.
172. Id.
173. 667 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
174. Id. at 603.
175. Id.
176. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50A (Vernon Supp. 1985) requires a consumer to
give written notice to the defendant of his specific complaint at least thirty days prior to filing
suit. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text. Within 30 days thereafter the defendant
may tender a written offer of settlement to the consumer, including an offer to reimburse the
consumer for his attorney's fees incurred to the date of the notice, and thereby avoid legal
action. Id. § 17.50A(c). If the settlement offer is rejected and the court finds that the offer is
substantially the same as the actual damages the trier of fact found, the DTPA limits the
consumer's recovery to the amount tendered or as found by the trier of fact, whichever is less.
Id. § 17.50A(d).
177. 660 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. 1983).
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$250 attorney's fees. The defendant offered to pay $4,030 less $.08 per mile
or $4.33 per day for each day the plaintiff had used the truck. The plaintiff
rejected this offer and recovered only $3,000 in actual damages at trial. The
court, however, refused to allow the defendant to rely upon section 17.50A
as a defense because the settlement offer had failed to include expressly
within its terms the plaintiff's attorney's fees. 178 The court's decision ap-
pears overly technical and contrary to the spirit behind section 17.50A.
The court in Chambless v. Barry Robinson Farm Supply, Inc. 179 also took
a strict approach in holding that section 17.50A was not available to the
defendant. The plaintiff served an adequate written notice complaining of
the purchase of a tractor from the defendant, and the defendant responded
by orally offering to buy back the tractor. Since the defendant had not made
the offer in a writing, however, the court held that the defendant had not
satisfied the requirements of section 17.50A and its provisions were not
available. 18 0
In Stendebach v. Campbell'8 1 and General Motors Corp. v. Ramsey 8 2 the
courts considered two defenses that were available to defendants prior to the
enactment of the 1979 amendments to the DTPA. 8 3 In the Stendenbach
decision the jury found that the defendant's misrepresentations were the re-
sult of a bona fide error. The court held that the defense of bona fide error
applies only to clerical errors, such as typographical errors or mistakes in
computations.' 8 4 In Ramsey the court held that the defendant who sold a
truck to the plaintiff was entitled to the submission of an issue inquiring
whether the defendant cured a defect in the vehicle prior to the date the suit
was filed.' 8 5 Although on its face the statutory defense applies only when a
defendant establishes that he was not given a reasonable opportunity to
cure,' 86 the court held that the defense would also apply in a case in which
the defendant had actually cured the defect about which the plaintiff
178. Id. at 815. Even though the amount offered exceeded the combination of both the
actual damages as found by the jury and the attorney's fees demanded in the letter, the failure
to designate a portion of the offer as being for reimbursement of attorney's fees rendered the
offer ineffective. Id.
179. 667 S.W.2d 598, 602 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.).
180. Id.
181. 665 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
182. 669 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, writ granted).
183. See Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act-Definitions, Relief, De-
fenses, Legislative Intent, ch. 216, §§ 1-14, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 600-05, amended by Decep-
tive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection, ch. 603, §§ 1-10, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1327-32.
Section 17.50A(l) provided a defense against treble damages upon a showing that the alleged
conduct was the result of a bona fide error. 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws at 604. Section 17.50A(2)
provided a similar defense upon a showing that the plaintiff did not afford the defendant an
opportunity to cure a breach of warranty. Id. Under the current version of the DTPA, if any
part of the plaintiff's cause of action arose prior to the effective date of the amendments to the
statute, the prior statutory provisions control. ABC Truck Rental v. Southern County Mut.
Ins. Co., 662 S.W.2d 132, 134-35 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
184. 665 S.W.2d at 559. The bona fide error defense is no longer available.
185. See Ramsey, 669 S.W.2d at 824.




The court in Jernigan v. Page'88 allowed a defendant to rely upon a de-
fense not specified within the DTPA itself. The defendant sold a parcel of
land to a third party by a contract for deed, and the third party conveyed the
property to the plaintiffs. When the third party defaulted on the note given
in payment for his purchase from the defendant, the defendant foreclosed on
the property and purchased the land at the foreclosure sale. The defendant
than demanded that the plaintiffs purchase the land from the defendant if
they desired to maintain possession. The plaintiffs alleged that the series of
events constituted an unconscionable action or course of action on the part
of the defendant and sought damages under the DTPA. The court held that
since the defendant had properly recorded his interest in the real estate, the
plaintiffs as a matter of law had notice of the defendant's claim.' 8 9 The
court held that the notice provided by filing the instrument was a defense to
an action under the DTPA, noting that the plaintiffs were not deceived by
the defendant in any way, but rather had suffered a loss as the result of their
own lack of diligence.' 90 Similarly, in Hernandez v. Telles' 91 the court al-
lowed a defendant to rely upon a defense not set out in the DTPA. The
court affirmed a take-nothing judgment in favor of the defendant based upon
jury findings that the plaintiff had agreed to a compromise and settlement of
its claims. 192
The court in Joseph v. PPG Industries, Inc. 193 took a much narrower view
of the defenses available under the DTPA. The plaintiff in Joseph hired a
general contractor to build a commercial building, and the contractor en-
tered into an agreement to purchase the windows from PPG. After installa-
tion of the windows, the contractor abandoned the job without paying PPG.
The windows turned out to be defective, and the plaintiff sued PPG under
the DTPA. PPG had offered the contractor only a limited warranty, the
terms of which limited PPG's obligation to the provision of replacement
units. PPG offered to provide the units, but the plaintiff insisted that PPG
pay for installation as well. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of
PPG, relying upon the failure of consideration that occurred when PPG was
not paid for the windows. Acknowledging the fairness of the lower court's
judgment, the court of appeals nevertheless concluded that the fact that the
defendant never received payment for the goods did not affect the plaintiff's
187. Id. at 825. The opportunity to cure defense is also no longer available.
Editor's Note: After this Article went to print, the Texas Supreme Court ruled on the Ram-
sey case, affirming in part and reversing in part the opinion of the court of appeals. General
Motors Corp. v. Ramsey, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 218 (Jan. 30, 1985).
188. 662 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
189. Id. at 762. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6646 (Vernon 1969) provides that a
properly recorded instrument shall be held as notice to all persons of its existence.
190. 662 S.W.2d at 763.
191. 663 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ).
192. Id. at 93. Since the plaintiff had agreed to return the defective merchandise in ex-
change for a full refund, and since the defendant was ready, willing, and able to perform its
part of the agreement, the court barred the plaintiff from subsequently breaching the compro-
mise agreement and seeking damages under the DTPA. Id.
193. 674 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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status as a consumer.1 94
Plaintiffs often rely upon section 17.42195 as a bar to asserted defenses.
The plaintiff in Ellmer v. Delaware Mini-Computer Systems, Inc. 196 sought to
rely upon this provision to defeat a limitation of warranty contained in its
contract with the defendant. The court held that the waiver was sufficient to
comply with the Uniform Commercial Code requirements. 197 Relying upon
Texas Supreme Court authority,198 the court held that the limitation was
enforceable despite the provisions of section 17.42.199 The court in Com-
merce Park v. Mardian Construction Co. 200 reaffirmed the principle that the
Federal Arbitration Act201 preempts the nonwaiver provision of the
DTPA.20 2 As a result, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's order stay-
ing the plaintiff's DTPA suit until arbitration had been completed in accord-
ance with the terms of the parties' contract.20 3
F. Damages
In Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc. 204 the Texas Supreme Court clari-
fied the circumstances under which a plaintiff will be allowed to recover
damages for mental anguish caused by DTPA violations. The supreme
court held that a finding that a DTPA violation was committed knowingly
was sufficient to support an award of mental anguish damages. 20 5 The court
in Luna also clarified a damage question of general interest by finding that a
plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for loss of use of an automobile de-
spite the fact that the plaintiff has not expended any money for alternative
194. Id. at 865-66. The court noted that the defense of failure of consideration is a com-
mon law defense, which the court refused to allow to defeat a claim under the DTPA. The
court's apparent belief that only those defenses specifically enumerated within the Act are
available in a DTPA case is inconsistent with the decisions in Jernigan and Hernandez, and the
holding certainly caused an inequitable result in Joseph. Id.
195. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon Supp. 1985). The section provides
that waivers by consumers of the provisions of the DTPA are unenforceable and void, except
when the consumer is engaged in business and has substantial assets.
196. 665 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
197. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (waiver of
warranty of merchantability must mention warranty and be conspicious; waiver of fitness must
be conspicious).
198. See G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392, 393-94 (Tex. 1982).
199. 665 S.W.2d at 160-61.
200. 729 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1984).
201. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
202. For a discussion of the principle, see Hughes, supra note 94, at 43-44.
203. 729 F.2d at 337-38.
204. 667 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. 1984).
205. Id. at 117. The court reiterated that at common law mental anguish damages are
recoverable whenever there is proof of a willful tort, willful and wanton disregard of the plain-
tiff's rights, or gross negligence. Id. Since gross negligence is a less culpable state of mind than
knowing conduct, the court held that to award mental anguish damages to a plaintiff who
establishes knowing conduct on the part of the defendant is proper. Consequently, the same
jury finding that authorizes an award of discretionary damages under the DTPA will also
justify an award of damages for mental anguish. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1985); Miller v. Dickenson, 677 S.W.2d 253, 259-60 (Tex. App.-




transportation. 20 6 In so holding, the court expressly disapproved well-estab-
lished precedents to the contrary.20 7
In Martin v. McKee Realtors, Inc.208 the Texas Supreme Court held that
to recover discretionary damages a plaintiff in a jury trial must obtain a jury
finding regarding the amount of such damages. 20 9 The plaintiff had obtained
a jury finding that the defendant had acted knowingly, and based upon this
finding the trial court had awarded discretionary damages. The supreme
court affirmed the holding of the court of appeals that the plaintiff must
request a jury issue on the amount of the discretionary damages, and the
failure to do so amounted to a waiver. 210 The manner of submitting DTPA
damage issues to a jury was also the subject of the Amarillo court of appeals'
opinion in Chrysler Corp. v. McMorries.2 11 The issue the trial court submit-
ted merely inquired as to the amount of money that would fairly and reason-
ably compensate the plaintiff for his actual damages and did not instruct the
jury as to the proper elements to be considered. The court of appeals found
this omission was reversible error, holding that the trial court's charge must
limit the jury's consideration to facts that are properly a part of the damages
allowable under the controlling legal principles. 2 12
The McMorries court went on to discuss in detail the proper measure of
damages to be applied in the case. The court noted that the damages recov-
erable under the DTPA are construed to mean those damages that are recov-
erable at common law.2 13 Since McMorries alleged that Chrysler had made
various misrepresentations regarding the automobile he purchased, the court
held that the damages should be viewed in terms of both a common law tort
action for fraudulent misrepresentation and a common law contract action
for breach of warranty. 21 4 Since the plaintiff had alleged conduct on the part
of the defendant that fitted the description of both a tort and a contract
action, the court held that the jury should determine the damages sustained
under both the out-of-pocket measure and the loss-of-bargain rule.21 5 In
keeping with the principle that the DTPA was intended to permit the ad-
versely affected consumer to recover the greatest amount of actual damages
206. 667 S.W.2d at 118-19.
207. See, e.g., American Standard County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barbee, 262 S.W.2d 122, 124
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1953, no writ); Finley v. Beck, 16 S.W.2d 908, 909 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1929, no writ).
208. 663 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1984).
209. Id. at 447-48.
210. Id. at 448.
211. 657 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no writ).
212. Id. at 864-65.
213. Id. at 864.
214. Id. at 864-65. Under the tort measure of damages, a plaintiff is allowed to recover his
out-of-pocket loss, which is measured by the difference between the price paid and the value of
the object received. Id. at 864. On the other hand, in a contract action the proper measure of
damages compensates the plaintiff for the loss of his bargain. Under this rule, the plaintiff is
allowed to recover the difference between the value of the goods as warranted and their value




he has alleged and established by proof,2 16 the court held that the plaintiff
should recover the greater of the two measures as found by the jury. 2 17
As the Dallas court of appeals' opinion in Heritage Housing Corp. v. Fer-
guson218 illustrates, a different measure of damages is applied when the
plaintiff's complaint arises out of a breach of warranty incident to the con-
struction and sale of a house as opposed to a sale of goods. The plaintiff
alleged that the house she purchased was not built as represented. The court
held that in construction cases brought under the DTPA actual damages
may be based on the cost of repairs, or, when correction of defects would
require uneconomical charges or expenses, the difference between the value
of the structure as built and the value it would have had if built without
defects. 2 19 The court held that under this rule the plaintiff was entitled to
the remedial cost or the difference in value, whichever was less. 220
The plaintiff, however, must elect which measure to plead and prove. The
plaintiff in Ferguson limited her proof to the difference in value of the house
as built and the value the house would have had if it had been built without
defects. The court held that the burden then shifted to the defendant, if it
was dissatisfied with that measure of damages, to prove that the remedial
cost would have been less. 221 Because the defendant had failed to produce
any evidence regarding the cost of repair, the trial court had not erred in
awarding the plaintiff damages in an amount equal to the difference in value
of the house as received and as warranted.2 22
The court in Precision Homes, Inc. v. Cooper2 23 also considered the correct
measure of damages to be applied when a plaintiff's DTPA claim arises out
of a construction contract. The court held that the measure of damages is
dependent upon the state of completion of the contract. 224 If the contractor
has substantially complied with the contract, the plaintiff is limited to the
cost of repair as a measure of damages. 22 5 If the contractor has not substan-
tially complied with the contract, the plaintiff is entitled to cover the differ-
ence in value between the structure as warranted and as received. 226
The court's reasoning in Cooper more closely parallels the general rule
applied in construction contract cases than the court's opinion in the Fergu-
216. Woo v. Great Southwestern Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
217. 657 S.W.2d at 865.
218. 674 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
219. Id. at 366; see Miller v. Dickenson, 677 S.W.2d 253, 258 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1984, no writ).
220. 674 S.W.2d at 366-67.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. 671 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
224. Id. at 927.
225. Id.
226. Id. In determining whether a contractor has substantially complied with a contract,
the court held that the trier of fact must determine what corrective work would be necessary to
obtain full compliance. If the entire structure must be changed, or if the corrective work will
result in damage to other parts of the building, or if the expense of such repair will be un-
economical, then the contractor has not substantially performed the contract. Id.
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son case. When defects in construction can be remedied without impairing
the building as a whole, the measure of damages is usually the reasonable
cost of remedying the defects. 227 If, however, the contractor cannot remedy
the defects without injury to the building or without expenditure for recon-
struction that is disproportionate to the benefit obtained, then damages are
measured by the difference between the value of the building as it is and as it
would have been if built in conformity with the contract.228  Since these
principles have controlled at common law, they also should be applied in
DTPA cases. 229 In Wolfe Masonry, Inc. v. Stewart230 the court of appeals
reaffirmed the proposition that any allowable set-off to the DTPA claim
must be subtracted from the plaintiff's damages prior to trebling.231
G. Attorney's Fees
A number of cases decided during the survey period considered the cir-
cumstances under which a defendant is authorized to recover attorney's fees
for defending against a DTPA claim. 232 In its denial of the writ of error in
Schott v. Leissner233 the Texas Supreme Court held that a defendant is enti-
tled to recover his attorney's fees on a finding of either harassment or that
the suit was groundless and brought in bad faith.234 The court did not ap-
prove the court of appeals' holding that issues of bad faith and harassment
are to be submitted to the jury. 2 3 5 Since the appeal did not present that
issue, the court reserved judgment on the question of whether the trial court
must make all findings required by section 17.50(c). 236  Such a holding
would seem to be consistent with the wording of the Act, which refers only
to a finding by the court and not to a finding by the trier of fact.237
227. See New Home Constr. Corp. v. O'Neill, 373 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
228. See Tarrant County v. Butcher & Sweeney Constr. Co., 443 S.W.2d 302, 307 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
229. See Brown v. American Transfer & Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931, 939 (Tex.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1015 (1980) (damages recoverable under DTPA are common law damages).
The court in Cooper also disapproved the Dallas court of appeals' holding in Indust-Ri-Chem
Laboratory, Inc. v. Par-Pak Co., 602 S.W.2d 282, 298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ),
to the effect that prejudgment interest is an item of damage that should be trebled in accord-
ance with the terms of the DTPA. Instead, the court in Cooper held that prejudgment interest
should be awarded from the date of the injury strictly on the actual damages that have been
sustained and not on the trebled damages. Cooper, 671 S.W.2d at 930-31.
230. 664 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
231. Id. at 104; see, e.g., Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 617 (Tex. 1980); Beeman v.
Worrell, 612 S.W.2d 953, 956-57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
232. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon Supp. 1985) provides: "On a
finding by the court that an action under this section was groundless and brought in bad faith,
or brought for the purpose of harassment, the court shall award to the defendant reasonable
and necessary attorney's fees and court costs."
233. 659 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983), writ ref'd n.r.e per curiam, 668
S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1984).
234. 668 S.W.2d at 686-87.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Decisions of the courts of appeals have generally adopted the view that the question of
whether a suit is groundless is for the court to decide, but that issues of bad faith and harass-
ment should be submitted to the jury. See Pope v. Darcey, 667 S.W.2d 270, 274 (Tex. App.-
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The court in Pope v. Darcey238 allowed a defendant to recovery attorney's
fees for a bad faith DTPA claim even though the plaintiff dropped his
DTPA claims prior to trial.239 The court noted that the DTPA only re-
quires that a suit be brought in bad faith or for purposes of harassment in
order for one to be liable for a defendant's attorney's fees, not that the
DTPA claim be prosecuted to its conclusion. 24° The court went on to hold
that the defendants were entitled to recover their attorney's fees incurred
after the DTPA claims were dismissed. 241 Thus, the DTPA entitles a de-
fendant to recover fees incurred both in the defense of the plaintiff's DTPA
claim and in the prosecution of the defendant's counterclaim for attorney's
fees. Similarly, in Molinar v. Plains Insurance Co. 242 the court allowed a
defendant to pursue its counterclaim for attorney's fees after the plaintiff
took a nonsuit of its DTPA claim.
In McKinley v. Drozd243 the supreme court resolved a conflict among the
courts of appeals on the issue of whether a DTPA claimant faced with a
counterclaim must obtain a net recovery in order to recovery attorney's
fees. 244 Drozd, a general contractor, brought suit against the McKinleys to
recover the balance due on a construction contract. The McKinleys coun-
terclaim alleged, among other things, violations of the DTPA. The jury
found for Drozd in the amount of $24,836.71 and for the McKinleys in the
amount of $7,500 for Drozd's violation of the DTPA. The trial court
awarded attorney's fees to both parties. The court of appeals reversed the
award to the McKinleys, holding that they were not entitled to any attor-
ney's fees because they did not receive a net recovery. 245
Consistent with the legislative mandate to construe the DTPA liberally in
order to protect consumers, 246 the supreme court reversed, concluding that a
party who obtains a DTPA recovery is entitled to attorney's fees even
though the opposing party's claim entirely offsets the DTPA recovery. 247
The court commented upon its earlier holding that offsets against DTPA
Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Parks v. McDougall, 659 S.W.2d 875, 876 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ); La Chance v. McKown, 649 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In fact, the court in Parks v. McDougall held that it
was reversible error for a trial court to rule on the existence of bad faith or purposes of harass-
ment in a case that had been submitted to the jury. 659 S.W.2d at 876.
238. 667 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
239. Id. at 272-73.
240. Id. at 273.
241. Id. at 274.
242. 660 S.W.2d 845, 849-50 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no writ).
243. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 190 (Jan. 12, 1985).
244. Compare Guerra v. Brumlow, 630 S.W.2d 425, 430-31 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1982, no writ) (DTPA recovery justifies award of attorney's fees, even if recovery entirely
offset by counterclaim), with Widmer v. Stamps, 663 S.W.2d 875, 882-83 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ) (DTPA claimant must obtain net recovery to recovery attor-
ney's fees).
245. 670 S.W.2d 405, 406 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984), rev'd, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 190
(Jan. 12, 1985).
246. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
247. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 191.
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recoveries are deducted before trebling the damages. 248 The court noted
that the different policy grounds underlying the award of punitive treble
damages and the award of attorney's fees justified the differing treatment. 249
A number of cases during the survey period dealt with the amount of
attorney's fees to which a prevailing plaintiff is entitled. In Doerfier v. Es-
pensen Co. 250 the court held that an award of attorney's fees is mandatory in
a case in which a plaintiff establishes his right to recover under the
DTPA. 25 1 The trial court correctly set aside the jury's findings that the rea-
sonable amount of attorney's fees the plaintiff incurred was zero. The trial
court was not justified in substituting its finding as to the reasonable amount
of attorney's fees for that of the jury, however, and the court reversed the
case and remanded for a separate trial on the reasonable amount of attor-
ney's fees to be awarded. 252
In Jack Roach Ford v. De Urdanavia25 3 the court of appeals ordered a
remittitur after the plaintiff recovered $28,500 in attorney's fees and only
$500 in actual damages. The court held that an award of $20,000 would be
appropriate under the circumstances. 254 The court in Terminix Interna-
tional, Inc. v. LuccP55 took an exceedingly niggardly view of what consti-
tutes reasonable attorney's fees. The court found the trial court's
conditional award of $7,500 for attorney's fees in the event the losing party
appealed to be excessive in the amount of $3,000.256 In addition, the court
held that the $3,500 conditional award granted in the event application was
made for writ of error to the supreme court to be excessive in the amount of
$2,000, and the conditional award for attorney's fees in the supreme court in
the amount of $1,500 in the event the court granted the writ to be excessive
by $500.257
V. FRAUD AND CONSPIRACY
The majority of the fraud cases decided during the survey period dealt
with claims by plaintiffs alleging that a defendant's failure to perform a
248. Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 617 (Tex. 1980); see supra notes 230-31 and ac-
companying text.
249. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 191-92. The court went on to hold that a party can recover his
attorney's fees in a claim brought under TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp.
1985) even if he does not obtain a net recovery. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 192.
250. 659 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
251. Id. at 931.
252. Id.
253. 659 S.W.2d 725 (rex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
254. Id. at 729-30.
255. 670 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
256. Id. at 666-67.
257. Id. This ruling by the court of appeals is completely unrealistic in light of the fact that
the trial below took seven full days to complete. The most efficient of lawyers would certainly
be hard pressed to do a competent job of reviewing a record of this size, preparing a quality
brief, and attending an oral argument for $4,500. Although the court's ruling must be attrib-
uted to the fact that the plaintiff's recovery was only $26,465, the court's ruling would appear
to be inappropriate even in light of the amount in controversy. This argument is especially




promise constituted actionable fraud. Although the law is well-established
that a simple breach of contract is not actionable fraud, 258 failure to perform
a promise can form the basis of a fraud action if the plaintiff establishes that
at the time the defendant made the promise he had no intention of carrying
it out.259 The plaintiff in Chancellors Racquet Club v. Schwartz26° alleged
that he was induced to purchase a membership in the defendant racquet club
by the defendant's representation that no discount memberships would be
available at any time in the future. Seven months later the defendant offered
a lesser-priced membership to the public, which formed the basis of the
plaintiff's fraud suit for rescission. The court held that the defendant's rep-
resentation regarding the nonoccurrence of a future event should be treated
just as if the defendant had made a promise to perform in the future.26' The
plaintiff failed to plead and prove that at the time the defendant made the
representations he actually planned to offer a discounted membership. The
absence of this essential element was fatal to the plaintiff's fraud claim, as
well as to his DTPA claim. 262
In Dodson v. Sizenbach263 the plaintiffs prevailed on their fraud claim
based upon the defendant's failure to pay in full a promissory note.264 The
defendant's own testimony established that he never intended to pay the full
amount of the note despite his written agreement to the contrary. The court
approved of a more indirect means of establishing a present intent not to
perform in Duval County Ranch Co. v. Wooldridge.265 The court in Duval
County held that the breach of a promise to perform coupled with a denial of
ever having made the promise is sufficient to show fraudulent intent on the
part of the defendant. 266
The court in Duval County also discussed the issues of which parties can
be found liable for fraudulent conduct, as well as to what extent damages are
recoverable. Specifically, the court held that a principal is liable for the
fraudulent misrepresentations of its agent made within the scope of its
agency even though the principal has no knowledge of the misrepresenta-
tions.267 The court noted that a director or officer of a corporation who
engages in a fraudulent action solely for the benefit of the corporation is
personally liable for his fraudulent acts, and that the officer or director and
the corporation are jointly and severally liable for the defrauded party's
damages. 268 In determining the scope of damages that are appropriate, the
court held on an issue of first impression that a plaintiff in an action for
258. See Levine v. Loma Corp., 661 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no
writ).
259. Id.
260. 661 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
261. Id. at 196.
262. Id.
263. 663 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
264. Id. at 15.
265. 674 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ requested).
266. Id. at 335.
267. Id. at 336-37.
268. Id. at 337. See supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
same principles applied in DTPA cases.
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fraud is entitled to recover for damage to his business and to his credit. 269
The only conspiracy cases decided during the survey period merely reiter-
ated well-established principles. In Roberts v. Harvey270 the court held that
an essential element of a cause of action for civil conspiracy is an intent on
the part of the alleged conspirators to participate in the conspiracy. 27' In
Bates v. Fuller272 the court pointed out that if the purpose of the alleged
conspiracy is to further a legitimate interest of the conspirators, and if the
conspirators are pursuing legitimate means of accomplishing that purpose,
the conspiracy is not actionable even if malice toward the plaintiff has moti-
vated the conspirators. 273
VI. DEFAMATION AND INVASION OF PRIVACY
A. Single Publication Rule
In Holloway v. Butler274 the court adopted, apparently for the first time in
Texas, the single publication rule in cases involving mass media libel. 275 The
court distinguished the early case of Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson,276 which
had rejected the rule as applied to retail sales, noting that Renfro relied upon
a Restatement section 277 that has since been supplanted. 278 The Holloway
court held that:
[Plublication is complete on the last day of the mass distribution of
copies of the printed matter. It is that day when the publisher, editors
and authors have done all they can to relinquish all right of control,
title and interest in the printed matter. Publication, however, does not
encompass retail sales of individual copies or sales of back issues of the
printed matter. 279
B. Judicial Privilege
Three cases dealt with the scope of the absolute privilege that attaches to
statements made during the course of, or made in accounts of, judicial pro-
269. 674 S.W.2d at 336.
270. 663 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ).
271. Id. at 527.
272. 663 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
273. Id. at 517-18. The plaintiffs and the defendants in Bates were all heirs of one dece-
dent. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants conspired to convince the decedent to dispose of
her property prior to her death in a manner that would be beneficial to the defendants. Since
the defendants sought to further their legitimate interests by enhancing the value of the prop-
erty provided to them under the decedent's estate, the alleged conspiracy was not actionable.
Id.
274. 662 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). As is gen-
erally the case, the court's consideration of the single publication rule arose in the context of
determining the point at which the statute of limitations begins to run.
275. Id. at 690-92. The court noted that a federal district court had adopted the single
publication rule in the context of a publisher's acting through a distributor. See Stephenson v.
Triangle Pub., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 215, 218 (S.D. Tex. 1952).
276. 138 Tex. 434, 443, 160 S.W.2d 246, 251 (1942).
277. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 578 (1938).
278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A (1977) adopts the single publication rule.
279. 662 S.W.2d at 692.
1985]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ceedings. 280 In Levine v. CMP Publications, Inc. 281 the Fifth Circuit held
that the first amendment of the United States Constitution does not extend a
privilege to untrue accounts of judicial proceedings. 282 Moreover, the statu-
tory and common law privilege applies only to accounts of what was said on
the public record and does not extend to background information or state-
ments of fact.283 In Astro Resources Corp. v. Ionics, Inc. 284 and Odeneal v.
Wofford 28 5 the privilege was extended to quasi-judicial proceedings before
NASA contracting officers in contract award proceedings and state bar
grievance proceedings, respectively. Both courts held that proceedings are
quasi-judicial when the decision-maker has the power or duty to investigate
and to make conclusions from the investigation.
286
C. Damages
In one of the most significant cases of the survey period, the Supreme
Court of Texas held in Doubleday & Co. v. Rogers287 that even in the con-
text of a libel per se, exemplary damages cannot be recovered unless the
court awards actual damages.288 In Doubleday the defendant had published
a book that contained an admittedly false statement that plaintiff had been
indicted three times for practicing optometry without a license. The jury
found that the statement was made with malice. The jury further found that
Rogers suffered no actual damages, but awarded exemplary damages in the
amount of $2,500,000. The trial court entered a take-nothing judgment on
the basis of the zero actual damage finding. The court of appeals reversed
and awarded the exemplary damages found by the jury. 289 The supreme
court reversed and reinstated the take-nothing judgment. 290
The argument Rogers advanced to support the exemplary award was that
in order to recover such damages a plaintiff must only have shown himself
entitled to recover actual damages rather than to have actually recovered
such damages. The court of appeals 291 and the dissenting292 and concur-
ring293 opinions of the supreme court agreed with Rogers's reasoning that
280. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5432 (Vernon 1958) establishes the privilege for
"fair, true and impartial" accounts of judicial proceedings.
281. 738 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1984).
282. Id. at 670; see U.S. CONST. amend. I.
283. Id. at 668.
284. 577 F. Supp. 446, 447-48 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
285. 668 S.W.2d 819, 820 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
286. Astro Resources, 577 F. Supp. at 447; Odeneal, 668 S.W.2d at 820; see also Putter v.
Anderson, 601 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (internal affairs
division of police department is quasi-judicial body).
287. 674 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1984).
288. Id. at 755-56.
289. Rogers v. Doubleday & Co., 644 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1982).
290. 674 S.W.2d at 755-56.
291. 644 S.W.2d at 835.
292. 674 S.W.2d at 759 (Ray, J., dissenting). The dissent includes an extensive citation to
decisions from other jurisdictions that the dissent argues support the exemplary award.
293. 674 S.W.2d at 757 (Kilgarlin, J., concurring and dissenting).
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because actual injury is presumed in a libel per se case,294 punitive damages
can be recovered irrespective of whether actual damages are awarded. The
policy argument that a defendant who is guilty of libel per se should not
escape liability merely because the libeled party enjoys an unassailable repu-
tation supports this conclusion. The supreme court majority, however,
noted that as a general rule punitive damages are not recoverable absent an
award of actual damages, and they declined to carve out an exception for
libel cases. 295 The majority rejected plaintiff's policy argument and offered
one of its own, stating that "[i]n light of the overwhelming policy considera-
tions that bear on the law of defamation, it would be peculiarly inappropri-
ate to adopt a rule that singled out libel defendants for a more harsh rule of
exemplary damage recovery than avails in other tort cases. ' '296
In the context of a slander case the San Antonio court of appeals attacked
the knotty problem of what standard of proof the plaintiff must meet in or-
der to secure the presumption of damages in a per se case of slander. Bolling
v. Baker297 presented a case between private individuals involving a per se
slanderous statement. The jury found malice and awarded actual and exem-
plary damages. On appeal the defendant argued that the plaintiff had not
offered proof of any actual damages caused by the slander and, therefore, the
plaintiff was not entitled to rely on the presumption of damage.
The court of appeals first noted that the United States Supreme Court
held in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.298 that the presumption of damages is
unconstitutional unless actual malice is shown.299 Subsequently, the Texas
Supreme Court adopted a negligence standard with an actual injury require-
ment in Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc. 300 Both Gertz and Foster, how-
ever, involved media defendants. The issue before the court in Boiling was
whether the presumption of damage was available in a suit between private
parties in which actual malice was shown. The court held that nothing in
Gertz foreclosed the presumption of damage when malice was shown, and so
affirmed the trial court judgment. 30 1
D. Invasion of Privacy
Braun v. Flynt30 2 is a case that deserves reporting for its facts as well as
the legal principles it articulates. The plaintiff, a female employee of an
amusement park in San Marcos, Texas, performed a novelty act with "Ralph
the Diving Pig."' 30 3 Without her knowledge, Chic magazine published the
294. See First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
295. 674 S.W.2d at 754.
296. Id. at 755.
297. 671 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ dism'd).
298. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
299. Id. at 349.
300. 541 S.W.2d 809, 819-20 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1981).
301. 671 S.W.2d at 571.
302. 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 252, 83 L. Ed. 2d 189 (1984).
303. Id. at 247. The plaintiff would tread water in a pool while holding a bottle of milk.
Ralph would dive into the pool and feed from the bottle.
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plaintiff's picture with the pig on a page facing graphic cartoons and photo-
graphs. Plaintiff brought an action for libel, slander, and invasion of pri-
vacy. The plaintiff recovered separate actual and punitive damage awards
for the defamation and invasion of privacy claims. 3°4
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Braun presents a good discussion of the
expansion of privacy law and the overlap of the libel and false light invasion
of privacy causes in action. In particular, the court examined the elements
of the false light claim and held that Texas would follow the Restatement305
to require: (a) the false light in which the plaintiff was placed must be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the defendant must have had
knowledge or acted with reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized
matter and the false light in which the plaintiff would be placed. 30 6 The
court held that the jury verdict found both elements and that the evidence
supported the verdict. 307 Of particular significance was the court's reliance
upon the decision during the last survey period in Golden Bear Distribution
System v. Chase Revel, Inc. 308 for the proposition that the jury should prop-
erly consider the entire publication. 309 Also of significance was the court's
holding that Gertz does not preclude an award of punitive damages against a
media defendant upon a showing of recklessness or malice. 310
The overlap between defamation and invasion of privacy causes of action
creates the risk of duplicative awards. In Braun the court found the jury
award duplicative and held that a single publication cannot give rise to a
duplicative award merely because the publication yields causes of action for
both defamation and invasion of privacy. 311 In Sherman v. Times Herald
Printing Co. 312 the plaintiff, like Braun, sought recovery based upon claims
of defamation and invasion of privacy. The trial court refused to submit the
requested issues on the claim for invasion of privacy, but plaintiff recovered
on the defamation claim. On appeal the court expressed doubt as to the
viability of the claim for invasion of privacy, but did not reach the issue
because the court held any recovery on such a claim would be duplicative of
the alternate theory of libel. 31 3
VII. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Malicious Prosecution
Two cases decided during the survey period addressed the claim of mali-
304. Id. at 256-57.
305. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(e) (1977).
306. 726 F.2d at 252.
307. Id. at 255-58.
308. 708 F.2d 944, 948 (5th Cir. 1983); see Hughes, supra note 94, at 49.
309. 726 F.2d at 254. The court stated that common sense requires that the context and
manner in which a statement or picture appears determines to a large extent its effect upon the
person reading or seeing it. Id.
310. Id. at 256.
311. Id. at 258.
312. 671 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no writ).
313. Id. at 703.
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cious prosecution. In Fisher v. Beach314 the Dallas court of appeals, in a
summary judgment context, set out the elements that the plaintiff must
prove to establish a claim for malicious prosecution arising out of the institu-
tion of a criminal action against the plaintiff. The court stated that to prevail
on a claim for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must prove that the de-
fendant, with malice and without probable cause, caused a prosecution that
resulted in acquittal and caused damage to the plaintiff.31 5
In a different context, the Fifth Circuit highlighted one of the shortcom-
ings of the claim of malicious prosecution in its opinion in Shawnee Interna-
tional, N. V v. Hondo Drilling Co. 316 Shawnee alleged that Hondo had joined
it as a third-party defendant in an earlier action with knowledge that Shaw-
nee could have no possible third-party liability and that the reason for the
joinder was only to extract a settlement from Shawnee. The third-party ac-
tion had coincidentally come at the time of a proposed sale of Shawnee, and
as a result of the claim the purchaser reserved $2,011,499 out of the
$2,511,499 purchase price as security for the claim. Shawnee contributed
$300,000 to settle the action, and then sued Hondo to recover the settlement
amount, attorney's fees, and the value of the loss of the use of the purchase
price withheld. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal for fail-
ure to state a claim. 317 The court relied on Moore v. Finholt318 for the prop-
osition that the mere filing of an action, no matter how unfounded or unjust,
is not actionable, unless it involves some wrongful process such as sequestra-
tion or attachment. 319 Modem world realities, in which the pendency of a
suit can be as much of an interference with the defendant's property or inter-
ests as an attachment, suggest a reexamination of this limitation on the tort
of malicious prosecution.
B. Assault-Respondeat Superior
Two cases during the survey period dealt with the issue of whether an
employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment when
the employee committed an assault. In Tierra Drilling Corp. v. Detmar320 an
oil field supervisor was held not to be within the course and scope of employ-
ment when he assaulted another employee. 321 For the employer to be liable,
the nature of the employment must necessarily involve the possibility that
the use of force may be needed in the employee's performance of his du-
ties.322 In Miller v. Towne Services, Inc. 323 the court held that the employer
is liable when the person committing the assault is in the course and scope of
314. 671 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
315. Id. at 66.
316. 742 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1984).
317. Id. at 236.
318. 638 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ).
319. 742 F.2d at 236.
320. 666 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
321. Id. at 662-63.
322. Id.
323. 665 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
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his duties in a management capacity when the assault occurs. 324 In Miller,
however, the plaintiff did not recover from the employer because he failed to
plead the required elements of course and scope of employment and manage-
rial capacity. 325
324. Id. at 146.
325. Id. at 147.
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